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In a study carried out by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) (2011), illicit financial 
flows for the years 2000-2008 from developing countries record an average of 
US$1.26 trillion outflow annually. The main sources of the illicit money are 
corruption, kickbacks, tax evasion, and theft of cash. Malaysia is ranked fifth among 
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White-collar crime continues to hit the headlines across Malaysia and it remains a 
serious issue influencing organizations globally. A share price event study is thus 
conducted on a group of  public  listed  companies in Malaysia to examine the 
announcement effect of white-collar crime. The period of the study is from 1996 to 
2010, covering both the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98 and the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in 2008/09. Results indicate the existence of significant negative 
abnormal share price reaction on 10 trading days subsequent to the day of 
announcement. It means that the stock market in Malaysia is not efficient. However, it 
implies that the market possesses the power to discipline unethical companies as the 
shareholders drive down their value by disposing their stocks following the 
announcement.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The term “white-collar crime” has been given many definitions by different 
criminologists at different times. It has first been popularized in 1939 by Edwin 
Sutherland, who was both a criminologist and a socialist. He defined the crime as one 
“committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation”  (Sutherland, 1949). Viewed  as being too restrictive, Edelhertz, a 
criminologist too, defined the crime as “an illegal act or series of illegal acts 
committed by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or 
property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or 
personal advantage” (Edelhertz, 1970). Edelhertz’s wider definition of the term is 
preferred for the purpose of this study and it can be used interchangeably with terms 
like “economic crime”, “corporate crime”, “business crime”, “financial crime”, and/or 
“commercial crime”. 
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all developing countries in the world in terms of the largest cumulative illicit outflows 
during 2000-2008, recording a total of US$291  billion. Among the developing 
countries in Asia, Malaysia is ranked second after China (US$2.18 trillion) (GFI, 
2011).  
 
In Malaysia, companies like Sime Darby Berhad, Alliance Financial Group Berhad, 
and Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Berhad had experienced a nose dive in their share 
prices following the announcement of suspected fraud and abuse of authority. 
Kenmark, for instance, was wiped out of some Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 100 million in 
market value over merely a week’s time (“What’s Going,” 2010). Sime Darby, on 
another instance, lost some RM2 billion in its energy and utilities division in the 
financial year ended June 30, 2010 (“Sime Darby,” 2011). The effect of the press 
announcement of white-collar crime requires serious attention as the likely adverse 
effect on the share price of the alleged companies may lead to possible economic 
damage of investors. 
 
The occurrences of fraud, as surveyed by KPMG (2009), are expected to rise 
continually for a couple of years. These findings will prove to be harmful to the 
companies in Malaysia when investors, local or foreign, remain to have little faith 
towards the country’s business ethics. It is imperative, with the increasing number of 
occurrences, that corporate Malaysia understands whether or not the stockholders will 
drive down the value of the company’s stock when the commitment of crime is made 
known to them. The existence of such a reaction would mean that the announcement 
effect of white-collar crime in Malaysia is deterrent in nature. Thus, the main purpose 
of the research is to investigate and identify the announcement effect of white-collar 
crime towards the stock performance of the affected companies in Malaysia. 
 
The paper is organized into 5 sections. Section 1 introduces the seriousness of white-
collar crime in Malaysia and the rationale behind conducting a share price event study. 
In the next section, different results of the announcement effect on share returns are 
examined from the review of past studies in this area. Section 3 then presents the 
methodology of conducting a share price event study. In Section 4, the findings of the 
study are discussed and the last section contains the conclusion of the study. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The types of white-collar crimes subject to the recent survey conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) are asset misappropriation, accounting fraud, bribery 
and corruption, intellectual property infringement, money laundering, tax fraud, 
illegal insider trading, market fraud involving cartels colluding to fix prices, 
espionage, and others. There is no apparent categorization and the list is not 
exhaustive. Lim (2005) categorized the white-collar crime in Malaysia as criminal 
misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust, cheating/fraud, 
forgery/credit/Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card fraud, counterfeiting currency, 
defamation, product piracy, product counterfeiting, cyber crime, offences of 
communications and multimedia industries, offences of printing and publication, 
banking/financial fraud, loan sharking, securities fraud/listing offences/insider trading, 
commodities fraud, money laundering, insurance fraud, maritime fraud, offences of 
company, tax evasion, customs and smuggling offences, immigration and human 3 
 
trafficking offences, bribery and corruption, exchange control violations, consumer 
fraud, pollution offences, and occupational offences. No classification is made too. 
 
Gottschalk (2010), however, classified white-collar crime into four main categories 
only, namely, corruption, fraud, theft, and manipulation. He defined corruption as 
“the giving, requesting, receiving, or accepting of an improper advantage related to a 
position, office, or assignment” and its sub-categories are kickbacks, bribery, 
extortion, and embezzlement. The sub-categories for fraud are  identity fraud, 
mortgage fraud, and occupational fraud; for theft are theft of cash, intellectual 
property theft, and fraud; and for manipulation are laundering, cyber crime, bid 
rigging, and insider trading. Such a classification allows researchers and practitioners 
to organize their thoughts at ease when mapping crime. 
 
The literature on the effect of information releases on share returns is well-established 
(Hines, McBride & Page, 1999). Feroz, Park and Pastena (1991) discovered a stock 
market reaction to the announcement of the disputed issue, but not to the 
announcement of the resolved matter at a much later date. In the study conducted by 
Hines et al. (1999), the results demonstrate no price reaction to press notices because 
the Financial Reporting Review Panel (the Panel) did not release any information 
until the issue was resolved. The results are entirely different if according to the 
findings of Rao (1997) and Voon, Puah and Entebang (2008) because the information 
released on the announcement date contains ongoing disputed issues and not issues 
which have achieved resolution. The share price is found to react negatively to the 
announcement of white-collar crime on the day of the announcement. 
 
Foster (1986)  identified three factors determining whether an announcement has 
information content, namely (i) the capital market’s expectation as to the content and 
timing of the release; (ii) the implications of the release for the future distribution of 
security returns; and (iii) the credibility of the information source. The press notice 
issued by the Panel in Hines et al. (1999) was considered to be highly unexpected 
because the Panel did not release any information to the public until resolution. The 
implications of the Panel’s release towards the future returns of the security in 
question were somewhat detrimental as it might reduce the public’s faith towards the 
company. As far as the credibility of the information source is concerned, the Panel is 
a reputable body established by the government. Therefore, if according to the three 
factors advocated by Foster (1986), the press notice issued by the Panel should have 
high information content and caused a change in share prices. However, the findings 
of the study demonstrate otherwise. There is no evidence of a price reaction on the 
day of announcement. Such findings can perhaps be attributed to the leakage of 
information as the Panel does not have any power to stop others from disclosing 
information before an official notice is issued. 
 
The findings in the studies by Rao (1997)  and  Voon et al.  (2008)  are more 
straightforward in agreement to the three factors identified by Foster (1986). The 
announcement date of unethical conduct in Rao (1997) is defined as the date when a 
report is first published in the Wall  Street Journal. The date of announcement is 
highly unexpected to the public and the implications are undoubtedly injurious as it is 
the first time the public is made known of the conduct in question. In the study by 
Voon et al. (2008), however, the announcement date is set as the date a company is 
charged for committing corporate crime according to the information in the Securities 4 
 
Commission (SC) Malaysia’s official website. The announcement date might not be 
unexpected and the detrimental nature of the implications might have worn off 
because the news of the unethical conduct had already spread gradually to the public 
even before the companies were charged. In such circumstances, it is necessary to test 
not only the significance of average abnormal returns, but also the significance of 
cumulative abnormal returns (Jong, 2007). 
 
It is worthwhile to note that Rao (1997), Hines et al. (1999) and Voon et al. (2008) 
shared a common limitation. There are relatively few organizations which have been 
subject to the research due to data availability. Since the data points for testing market 
reaction are few, the accuracy of the results may be undermined. Future research 
relating to the announcement effect of white-collar crime should include more 
companies to achieve a more accurate result. 
 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Companies involved in the share price event study are or were listed publicly in Bursa 
Malaysia. The companies have been suspected of committing white-collar crime. The 
event refers to the day the alleged company is charged with committing white-collar 
crime. The companies and their respective announcement dates are obtained from the 
official website of SC Malaysia. The period of study is set to be 1996 to 2010. The 
event window in this study is extended from the typical 30 days before and after the 
event (Teall, 2007) to 40 days before and 30 days after the event to fully capture the 
effects of the event of interest. Ideally, the announcement date should be defined as 
the day the media makes known the suspicion of the occurrence of white-collar crime 
in a public listed company to the public to allow first-hand examination of the share 
price reaction. Regrettably, the limitation of the availability of data makes such 
examination almost impossible. 
 
The impact of the event study is represented by the abnormal return of the share price 
due to the event. In other words, the abnormal return is the difference between the 
stock’s actual return and the stock’s expected return in the absence of the event. Many 
researchers have used a single-index model to estimate abnormal return (Bodie, Kane 
& Marcus, 2009), which is expressed mathematically as Equation (1):  
 
  rt = a + brMt + et                (1) 
 
where 
rt  stock return during a given period t; 
a  the average rate of return the stock would realize in a period t with a zero 
market return; 
b  the sensitivity to the market return; 
rMt  the market’s rate of return during a given period t; and 
et  the part of a security’s return resulting from firm-specific events. 
 
The residual, et, is the measure of the abnormal performance of stock. It is the stock’s 
return below “what one would predict based on broad market movements in that 
period, given the stock’s sensitivity to the market” (Bodie et al., 2009). If et<0, then 5 
 
Parameter Estimation Period 
the actual return, rt, is less than the estimated return, a + brMt. Rewriting Equation (1) 
interprets the definition even clearer, as shown in Equation (2): 
 
  et = rt – (a + brMt)                (2) 
 
Estimating the regression parameters in Equation (1) (the intercept a and slope b) is 
the next task. The estimation must be careful and proper. The data used for estimation 
has to be sufficiently separated in time from the event in question so that the 
parameters are not affected by event-period abnormal stock performance. Following 
Dyckman, Philbrick, and Stephan (1984), and Shaheen (2006), the holding period 
returns (HPRs) of each stock are calculated on a daily basis for 120 days prior to the 
event date to formulate a benchmark for normal returns. In the studies by Brown and 
Warner (1985), and Delaney and Wamuziri (2004), however, the number of days 
prior to the event date is bigger, which are 244 days and 240 days, respectively. As far 
as the parameter estimation period is concerned, many researchers advocate that slope 
b, or beta, is more stable when the horizon of the estimation period is longer (Ray, 
2010). As such, a maximum of 271 daily return observations, starting at day -240 and 
ending at day +30, is collected for the study  (see Figure 1). The 200 earliest 
observations are then used to estimate the regression parameters a and slope b for 
each individual security. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the Event Study Window 
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The estimated parameters and the actual returns of each security are then substituted 
into Equation (2) to calculate the residual, et, or the abnormal returns (ARs). The ARs 
can be analyzed separately for each security, but this may not be very informative as 
“a lot of stock price movements are caused by information unrelated to the event 
under study” (Jong, 2007). Therefore, the average abnormal returns (AARs) over the 
sample companies, N, at each trading day must be considered using the following 
Equation (3): 
 
  AARt = 
1
N ∑  ARit
N
i=1                 (3) 
 
On average, the information unrelated to the event is cancelled out because the 
abnormal returns are all centered surrounding the event in question and the effect of 
the event should be reflected on average (Jong, 2007). 
 
The computation of AAR is not sufficient in this study as the date the public is first 
made known of the allegedly unethical company cannot be ascertained exactly due to 
the question of data availability. Most studies
1
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 often take this into account by 
summing all the ARs over the time period of interest to find the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs). The CAR  is a better indicator of the total impact of information 
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release  (Bodie et al., 2009). Again, in event studies, the average of CARs is 
considered over the sample companies, N, at each trading day. The average of CARs 
is known as the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and it can be calculated 
using the following Equation (4): 
 
  CAAR = ∑  AARt
t2
t=t1                 (4) 
 
Subsequently, the AARs and CAARs have to be tested on their statistical significance. 
The null hypothesis that there is no negative abnormal return is to be tested using a 
simple t-test. The null hypothesis is as follows: 
 
  H0: E(ARit) ≥ 0                (5) 
 
The simple t-test for AARs is the ratio of AARt to its estimated standard deviation, 
σ �(AARt). The standard deviation has to be estimated from the time series of AARs in 
the parameter estimation period to ensure its stability and reliability. The t-test for 
AARs is as follows: 
 
  t(AARt) = 
AARt
σ �(AARt)                (6) 
 
For the CAAR shown in Equation (4), the test statistic is simply: 
 
  t(CAAR) = 
CAAR(t1,t2)




σ �(t1,t2) = √l σ �(AARt)                (8) 
 
The estimation of standard deviation for CAAR is applied in many studies (Khotari & 
Warner, 2006; Rao, 1997; Shaheen, 2006; Voon et al., 2008). l is the horizon length 
of the event period which can be calculated from t2 – t1 + 1. In this study, the l is 71 
trading days. 
 
In view of the small number of sample companies (N=14) and the nature of the null 
hypothesis, the critical value for the t-test has to be taken from the t-distribution table 
under one tail probabilities (Teall, 2007). It must also be noted that, in the estimation 
of σ �(AARt), the degree of freedom, N-1, is taken into account to eliminate the bias of 
taking deviations from the sample arithmetic average, AARt, instead of the unknown, 
true expected value, E(AARt) (Bodie et al., 2009). Once the critical value has been 
determined at 5% level of significance, if t is less than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis of no negative abnormal return is rejected, and vice versa. The critical 
value is -1.771 at 5% level of significance. 
 
 
4.  RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
The initial search of companies from 1996 to 2010 via the SC’s official website 
returns a total of 38 announcements from a total of 34 companies. During the filtering 
process, 4 companies have been found or suspected of committing white-collar crime 7 
 
on two occasions within the time window of study. Apart from the reason of data 
availability, a handful of the companies have been suspended from trading in the 
market. As such, it is not possible to include these companies in the share price event 
study. As shown in Table 1, the final sample contains 14 announcement dates on 
white-collar crime from 14 target companies. 
 
Table 1: Final Sample of Target Companies with their Announcement Dates 
  Target Company  Announcement Date 
1  Kim Hin Industry  20 November 1996 
2  Repco Holdings  29 November 1996 
3  Seal Incorporated  05 January 2001 
4  Pilecon Engineering  08 February 2001 
5  Chase Perdana  16 March 2001 
6  Idris Hydraulic  28 June 2002 
7  Fountain View  27 June 2005 
8  NasionCom Holdings  28 May 2007 
9  Transmile Group  12 July 2007 
10  Multi-Code Electronics  13 March 2009 
11  Mems Technology  16 April 2009 
12  United U-Li Corporation  28 April 2009 
13  LFE Corporation  24 June 2010 
14  Inix Technologies  23 September 2010 
Source: SC (2011). 
 
Figure 2: Graph of AAR % against Trading Day 
 
 
Figure 2 sets out a graph of percentage AARs on the y-axis against the trading day on 
the x-axis. The announcement date is indicated by 0 on the x-axis. Before any 
inspection of the graph, it is important to note that AARs must be less than 0 to 
indicate abnormal performance in relation to the announcement of white-collar crime 
as they show that the “stock prices decreased more than expected” (Rao, 1997; Voon 
et al., 2008). 
 
Upon inspection of the graph, the AAR on the day of the announcement is very close 
to 0 and it is recorded to be -0.664% (see Table 2). The fact that the AARs 
surrounding the day of information release are close to 0 implies no significant 8 
 
abnormal performance in relation to the announcement of white-collar crime. The 
statistical test for significance also confirms the findings as the t-values are not 
significant at all (see Table 2). Therefore, in terms of AARs, the null hypothesis that 
there is no negative abnormal return (H0: E(ARit) ≥ 0) cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 2: AARs% and CAARs% with their Respective t-values 
Trading Day Relative to 
Announcement Date 
AAR%  t-values for 
AAR% 
CAAR%  t-values for 
CAAR% 
0  -0.664  -0.427  -22.895  -1.749 
1  -1.466  -0.944  -24.361  -1.861** 
2   0.049   0.031  -24.312  -1.857** 
3  -0.075  -0.048  -24.387  -1.863** 
4  -1.709  -1.100  -26.096  -1.993** 
5   2.023   1.302  -24.073  -1.839** 
6   0.047   0.030  -24.026  -1.835** 
7  -1.271  -0.818  -25.297  -1.932** 
8  -0.334  -0.215  -25.631  -1.958** 
9   1.473   0.948  -24.158  -1.845** 
10   0.847   0.545  -23.311  -1.781** 
Note: Asterisks (**) denote significant at 5% level. 
 
Figure 3 shows the graph of percentage CAARs on the y-axis against the trading day 
on the x-axis. Inspection of the graph clearly depicts the gradual decrease in CAARs 
from Day -40 to a few days after t=0. To be exact, the day the CAARs hit the lowest 
point is on Day 4 (see Table 2), after which the CAARs start to increase steadily. The 
dramatic decrease after the announcement day reflects significant abnormal returns on 
the subsequent days. The statistical test also confirms the visual inspection of the 
graph. As shown in Table 2, all the CAARs from Day 1 to 10 are significant at 5% 
level. As a result, one can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is 
negative abnormal return following the announcement of white-collar crime. 
 
Figure 3: Graph of CAAR % against Trading Day 
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The difference in outcome of the two graphs arises from “leakage of information”. 
Here, the leakage refers to the period of time when the public is made known of the 
unethical companies until the day the companies are officially charged in court. 
During the leakage, the stock price has started to decrease weeks before the day the 
companies are charged. The AAR on the announcement day is, thus, a poor indicator 
of the total impact of the information release. The CAARs, however, capture the total 
stock movement for the entire period and reflect the impact of the information release 
on the announcement day or, in this case, the subsequent days. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The investigation of the announcement effect of white-collar crime in Malaysia, using 
share price event study, concludes that share price reacts negatively following the 
announcement. Significant negative CAARs are found continuously in the subsequent 
10 trading days, which equates to a period of two weeks. The findings indicate that 
most of the announcements are indeed news and contain information to the market 
and that the information has not been completely reflected in the share prices. 
 
Results of the investigation are consistent to those found in Feroz et al. (1991), Rao 
(1998) and Voon et al. (2008), but they differ from the results found in Hines et al. 
(1999). The outcome is not at all surprising as the former deals with ongoing disputed 
issues and the latter with resolved matters. The announcements in this research are 
announcements of ongoing disputed issues as the dates are set to be the day the 
companies are charged or prosecuted. For this reason, the results demonstrate 
evidence  of negative price reaction throughout the days subsequent to the day of 
announcement. 
 
Upon a more detailed inspection, the announcement effect of this research is slightly 
different than that in Rao (1998). In the study conducted by Rao (1998), significant 
abnormal performance is found on the day of announcement and none is found on 
subsequent days. In contrast, it is discovered in this study that there is no evidence of 
share price reaction on the day of announcement, but on the subsequent days.  
 
The distinction can perhaps be explained by the nature of the market in which the 
respective study is carried out. “Emerging markets that are less intensively analyzed 
than US markets and in which accounting disclosure requirements are less rigorous 
may be less efficient than US markets”  (Bodie et al., 2009). The event studies 
conducted by Rao (1998)  and in this research are  based in markets that are not 
efficient. If the market is efficient, significant negative abnormal return would not be 
discovered on the day of  announcement or subsequently because the share prices 
would react almost spontaneously to the announcement. The distinction, therefore, 
lies in the degree of efficiency. It may indicate that the market in which the study 
carried out by Rao (1998)  is more efficient because the share prices react more 
immediately in response to the bad news. As a result, there is no evidence of 
significant abnormal performance following the day of announcement in Rao (1998). 
Rao (1998) gathered his/her data in US markets. 
 
Markets that are less efficient have their implications. According to Bodie et al. 
(2009), “the sluggish response of stock prices to fundamental supply-and-demand 10 
 
factors is the key to successful technical analysis”. Apart from predicting patterns in 
share prices, more importantly, Malaysia market may have the power to discipline 
unethical companies. The fact that significant negative CAARs are found for 10 
continuous trading days imply that shareholders do react significantly to the 
announcement of white-collar crime. They are worried that the company may be 
suspended from trading and can never recover from the incident. Consequently, the 
shareholders will drive down the company’s equity value by disposing their shares 
immediately after the news is made known to them. However, the question remains 
how strong the deterrence effect of announcement is in Malaysia. Future studies can 
investigate whether or not market discipline is efficient in deterring companies from 
committing white-collar crime in Malaysia. 
 
In the process of conducting the research, one of the limitations is concerned with the 
determination of the announcement date is not an ideal one. The question of data 
availability does not permit the day of announcement to be set as the day the public is 
made known of the alleged unethical behavior of a company. Otherwise, returns from 
the share price event study can be more informative and representative of the 
announcement effect of white-collar crime in Malaysia. 
 
The other limitation is that the number of target companies may be too small for the 
results of event study to be representative of the market reaction in Malaysia. 14 
public companies are far from sufficient to capture the true effect of the 
announcement of white-collar crime. Future studies, therefore, should strive to gather 
more companies to compensate the lacking in this study. The question of data 
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